ginning and huckstering
conclusion, they manifested a resolve that Germany should always and
everywhere succeed. The Berlin journal, the _Post_, went so far as to
call the Kaiser _ce poltron miserable_ for giving up South Morocco; and
it was clear that a large section of the German people ardently desired
war with the Western Powers.
Many Frenchmen and Belgians credited the German colonial party with the
design of acquiring the whole of the French Congo, as a first step
towards annexing the Belgian Congo[535]. Belgium became alarmed, and in
1913 greatly extended the principle of compulsory military service. On
the other hand, the German Chauvinists certainly desired the acquisition
of a naval base in Morocco which would help to link up their naval
stations and facilitate the conquest of a World Empire. This was the
policy set forth by Bernhardi in the closing parts of his work, _Germany
and the next War,_ where he protested against the Chancellor's surrender
of Morocco as degrading to the nation and damaging to its future.
Following the lead of Treitschke, he depreciated colonies rich merely in
products; for Germany needed homes for her children in future
generations, and she must fight for them with all her might at the first
favourable opportunity. This is the burden of Bernhardi's message, which
bristles with rage at the loss of Morocco. He regarded that land as more
important than the Congo; for, in addition to the strategic value of its
coasts, it offered a fulcrum in the west whereby to raise the Moslems
against the Triple Entente. In the Epilogue he writes: "Our relations
with Islam have changed for the worse by the abandonment of
Morocco. . . . We have lost prestige in the whole Mohammedan world,
which is a matter of the first importance for us."
[Footnote 535: Hanotaux, _La Politique de l'Equilibre_, p. 417.]
The logical conclusion of Bernhardi's thesis was that Germany and
Austria should boldly side with the Moors and Turks against France and
Italy, summoning Islam to arms, if need be, against Christendom. Perhaps
if Turkey had possessed the 1,500,000 troops whom her War Minister,
Chevket Pacha, was hopefully striving to raise, this might have been the
outcome of events. As it was, _Realpolitik_ counselled prudence, and the
observance of the forms of Christianity.
Certainly there was no sufficient pretext for war. France and Russia had
humoured Germany. As to "the real enemy," light was thrown on her
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