tal
grounds she could scarcely take up the gauntlet for her former
oppressor, Austria, against two nations which had assisted in her
liberation. As we shall see, she declared at the Conference of Algeciras
her complete solidarity with Great Britain.
Even so, Germany held a commanding position owing to the completion of
the first part of her naval programme, which placed her far ahead of
France at sea. For reasons that have been set forth, the military and
naval weakness of France was so marked as greatly to encourage German
Chauvinists; but the Entente made them pause, especially when France
agreed to concentrate her chief naval strength in the Mediterranean,
while that of Great Britain was concentrated in the English Channel and
the North Sea. It is certain that the Entente with France never amounted
to an alliance; that was made perfectly clear; but it was unlikely that
the British Government would tolerate an unprovoked attack upon the
Republic, or look idly on while the Pan-Germans refashioned Europe and
the other Continents. Besides, Great Britain was strong at sea. In 1905
she possessed thirty-five battleships mounting 12-in. guns; while the
eighteen German battleships carried only 11-in. and 9.4-in. guns.
Further, in 1905-7 we began and finished the first _Dreadnought_; and
the adoption of that type for the battle-fleet of the near future
lessened the value of the Kiel-North Sea Canal, which was too small to
receive _Dreadnoughts_. In these considerations may perhaps be found the
reason for the caution of Germany at a time which was otherwise very
favourable for aggressive action.
Meanwhile Kaiser William, pressed on by the colonials, had intervened in
a highly sensational manner in the Morocco Affair, thus emphasising his
earlier assertion that nothing important must take place in any part of
the world without the participation of Germany. Her commerce in Morocco
was unimportant compared with that of France and Great Britain; but the
position of that land, commanding the routes to the Mediterranean and
the South Atlantic, was such as to interest all naval Powers, while the
State that gained a foothold in Morocco would have a share in the Moslem
questions then arising to prime importance. As we have seen, the Kaiser
had in 1898 declared his resolve to befriend all Moslem peoples; and his
Chancellor, Buelow, has asserted that Germany's pro-Islam policy
compelled her to intervene in the Moroccan Question. The Ge
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