rman
ambassador at Constantinople, Baron von Marschall, said that, if after
that promise Germany sacrificed Morocco, she would at once lose her
position in Turkey, and therefore all the advantages and prospects that
she had painfully acquired by the labour of many years[514].

[Footnote 514: Buelow, _Imperial Germany_, p. 83.]

On the other hand, the feuds of the Moorish tribes vitally concerned
France because they led to many raids into her Algerian lands which she
could not merely repel. In 1901 she adopted a more active policy, that
of "pacific penetration," and, by successive compacts with Italy, Great
Britain, and Spain, secured a kind of guardianship over Moroccan
affairs. This policy, however, aroused deep resentment at Berlin. Though
Germany was pacifically penetrating Turkey and Asia Minor, she grudged
France her success in Morocco, not for commercial reasons but for
others, closely connected with high diplomacy and world-policy. As the
German historian, Rachfahl, declared, Morocco was to be a test of
strength[515].

[Footnote 515: Tardieu, _Questions diplomatiques de 1904_, pp. 56-102;
Rachfahl, _Kaiser und Reich_, pp. 230-241; E.D. Morel, _Morocco in
Diplomacy_, chaps, i-xii.]

In one respect Germany had cause for complaint. On October 6, 1904,
France signed a Convention with Spain in terms that were suspiciously
vague. They were interpreted by secret articles which defined the
spheres of French and Spanish influence in case the rule of the Sultan
of Morocco ceased. It does not appear that Germany was aware of these
secret articles at the time of her intervention[516]. But their
existence, even perhaps their general tenor, was surmised. The effective
causes of her intervention were, firstly, her resolve to be consulted
in every matter of importance, and, secondly, the disaster that befel
the Russians at Mukden early in March 1905. At the end of the month, the
Kaiser landed at Tangier and announced in strident terms that he came to
visit the Sultan as an independent sovereign. This challenge to French
claims produced an acute crisis. Delcasse desired to persevere with
pacific penetration; but in the debate of April 19 the deficiencies of
the French military system were admitted with startling frankness; and a
threat from Berlin revealed the intention of humiliating France, and, if
possible, of severing the Anglo-French Entente. Here, indeed, is the
inner significance of the crisis. Germany had lately decla