the oriental
and colonial enterprises which formed its sequel. But that course, by
yielding to her undisputed ascendancy in all parts of the world, would
have led to a policy of partition. Now, since 1688, British statesmen
have consistently opposed, often by force of arms, a policy of partition
at the expense of civilised nations. Their aim has been to support the
weaker European States against the stronger and more aggressive, thus
assuring a Balance of Power which in general has proved to be the chief
safeguard of peace. In seeking an Entente with France, and subsequently
with Russia, British policy has followed the course consistent with the
counsels of moderation and the teachings of experience. We may note here
that the German historian, Count Reventlow, has pointed out that the
Berlin Government could not frame any lasting agreement with the
British; for, sooner or later, they would certainly demand the
limitation of Germany's colonial aims and of her naval development, to
neither of which could she consent. The explanation is highly
significant[504].
[Footnote 504: Reventlow, _Deutschlands auswaertige Politik_, pp. 178-9;
_Mr. Chamberlain's Speeches_, vol. ii. p. 68.]
Nevertheless, at first Great Britain sought to come to a friendly
understanding with Germany in the Far East, probably with a view to
preventing the schemes of partition of China which in 1900 assumed a
menacing guise. At that time Russia seemed likely to take the lead in
those designs. But opposite to the Russian stronghold of Port Arthur was
the German province of Kiao Chau, in which the Kaiser took a deep
interest. His resolve to play a leading part in Chinese affairs appeared
in his speech to the German troops sent out in 1900 to assist in
quelling the Boxer Rising. He ordered them to adopt methods of terrorism
like those of Attila's Huns, so that "no Chinaman will ever again dare
to look askance at a German." The orders were ruthlessly obeyed. After
the capture of Pekin by the Allies (September 1900) there ensued a time
of wary balancing. Russia and Germany were both suspected of designs to
cut up China; but they were opposed by Great Britain and Japan. This
obscure situation was somewhat cleared by the statesmen of London and
Berlin agreeing to maintain the territorial integrity of China and
freedom of trade (October 1900). But in March 1901 the German
Chancellor, Prince von Buelow, nullified the agreement by officially
announcing that i
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