n a voluminous sinner in
my own chapter on the will. [_Principles of Psychology_, vol. II, chap.
XXVI.]
[96] [Cf. F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, second edition, pp.
96-97.]
[97] [Cf. above, p. 59, note.]
[98] _Verborum gratia_: "The feeling of activity is not able, _qua_
feeling, to tell us anything about activity" (Loveday: _Mind_, N. S.,
vol. X, [1901], p. 463); "A sensation or feeling or sense _of_ activity
... is not, looked at in another way, an experience _of_ activity at
all. It is a mere sensation shut up within which you could by no
reflection get the idea of activity.... Whether this experience is or is
not later on a character essential to our perception and our idea of
activity, it, as it comes first, is not in itself an experience of
activity at all. It, as it comes first, is only so for extraneous
reasons and only so for an outside observer" (Bradley, _Appearance and
Reality_, second edition, p. 605); "In dem Taetigkeitsgefuehle liegt an
sich nicht der geringste Beweis fuer das Vorhandensein einer psychischen
Taetigkeit" (Muensterberg: _Grundzuege der Psychologie_). I could multiply
similar quotations and would have introduced some of them into my text
to make it more concrete, save that the mingling of different points of
view in most of these author's discussions (not in Muensterberg's) make
it impossible to disentangle exactly what they mean. I am sure in any
case, to be accused of misrepresenting them totally, even in this note,
by omission of the context, so the less I name names and the more I
stick to abstract characterization of a merely possible style of
opinion, the safer it will be. And apropos of misunderstandings, I may
add to this note a complaint on my own account. Professor Stout, in the
excellent chapter on 'Mental Activity,' in vol. I of his _Analytic
Psychology_, takes me to task for identifying spiritual activity with
certain muscular feelings and gives quotations to bear him out. They are
from certain paragraphs on 'the Self,' in which my attempt was to show
what the central nucleus of the activities that we call 'ours' is.
[_Principles of Psychology_, vol. I, pp. 299-305.] I found it in certain
intracephalic movements which we habitually oppose, as 'subjective,' to
the activities of the transcorporeal world. I sought to show that there
is no direct evidence that we feel the activity of an inner spiritual
agent as such (I should now say the activity of 'consciousness' a
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