FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   >>  
st materially satisfactory hypothesis. Mr. Joseph handles it by formal logic purely, as if he had no acquaintance with the logic of hypothesis at all. Mr. Joseph again is much bewildered as to what a humanist can mean when he uses the word knowledge. He tries to convict me[137] of vaguely identifying it with any kind of good. Knowledge is a difficult thing to define briefly, and Mr. Joseph shows his own constructive hand here even less than in the rest of his article. I have myself put forth on several occasions a radically pragmatist account of knowledge,[138] the existence of which account my critic probably does not know of--so perhaps I had better not say anything about knowledge until he reads and attacks that. I will say, however, that whatever the relation called knowing may itself prove to consist in, I can think of no conceivable kind of _object_ which may not become an object of knowledge on humanistic principles as well as on the principles of any other philosophy.[139] I confess that I am pretty steadily hampered by the habit, on the part of humanism's critics, of assuming that they have truer ideas than mine of truth and knowledge, the nature of which I must know of and can not need to have re-defined. I have consequently to reconstruct these ideas in order to carry on the discussion (I have e.g. had to do so in some parts of this article) and I thereby expose myself to charges of caricature. In one part of Mr. Joseph's attack, however, I rejoice that we are free from this embarrassment. It is an important point and covers probably a genuine difficulty, so I take it up last. When, following Schiller and Dewey, I define the true as that which gives the maximal combination of satisfactions, and say that satisfaction is a many-dimensional term that can be realized in various ways, Mr. Joseph replies, rightly enough, that the chief satisfaction of a rational creature must always be his thought that what he believes is _true_, whether the truth brings him the satisfaction of collateral profits or not. This would seem, however, to make of truth the prior concept, and to relegate satisfaction to a secondary place. Again, if to be satisfactory is what is meant by being true, _whose_ satisfactions, and _which_ of his satisfactions, are to count? Discriminations notoriously have to be made; and the upshot is that only rational candidates and intellectual satisfactions stand the test. We are then driven to a
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   124   125   126   127   128   129   130   131   132   133   134   135   136   137   138   139   140   141   142   143   >>  



Top keywords:
Joseph
 

knowledge

 

satisfactions

 
satisfaction
 

article

 

object

 

principles

 

define

 

account

 

rational


hypothesis

 
satisfactory
 

important

 
embarrassment
 
Schiller
 

covers

 

intellectual

 

difficulty

 

genuine

 

attack


driven

 

discussion

 

expose

 

rejoice

 

charges

 
caricature
 

concept

 

creature

 

relegate

 

secondary


thought

 

collateral

 
profits
 

believes

 

brings

 

rightly

 

replies

 

notoriously

 

Discriminations

 

upshot


combination
 
maximal
 

realized

 

dimensional

 

candidates

 
constructive
 

briefly

 
identifying
 
Knowledge
 

difficult