ve never felt the slightest respect for the
idealistic arguments which Mr. Pitkin attacks and of which Ferrier made
such striking use; and I am perfectly willing to admit any number of
noumenal beings or events into philosophy if only their pragmatic value
can be shown.

Radical empiricism and pragmatism have so many misunderstandings to
suffer from, that it seems my duty not to let this one go any farther,
uncorrected.

* * * * *

Mr. Pitkin's 'reply' to me,[125] [...] perplexes me by the obscurity of
style which I find in almost all our younger philosophers. He asks me,
however, two direct questions which I understand, so I take the liberty
of answering.

First he asks: Do not experience and science show 'that countless things
are[126] experienced as that which they are not or are only partially?'
I reply: Yes, assuredly, as, for example, 'things' distorted by
refractive media, 'molecules,' or whatever else is taken to be more
ultimately real than the immediate content of the perceptive moment.

Secondly: "If experience is self-supporting[127] (in _any_ intelligible
sense) does this fact preclude the possibility of (a) something not
experienced and (b) action of experience upon a noumenon?"

My reply is: Assuredly not the possibility of either--how could it? Yet
in my opinion we should be wise not to _consider_ any thing or action of
that nature, and to restrict our universe of philosophic discourse to
what is experienced or, at least, experienceable.[128]

FOOTNOTES:

[122] [Reprinted from the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods_, vol. III, No. 26, December 20, 1906; and _ibid._,
vol. IV, No. 4, February 14, 1907, where the original is entitled "A
Reply to Mr. Pitkin." ED.]

[123] [W. B. Pitkin: "A Problem of Evidence in Radical Empiricism,"
_ibid._, vol. III, No. 24, November 22, 1906. ED.]

[124] [Above, p. 42. ED.]

[125] ["In Reply to Professor James," _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology
and Scientific Methods_, vol. IV, No. 2, January 17, 1907. ED.]

[126] Mr. Pitkin inserts the clause: 'by reason of the very nature of
experience itself.' Not understanding just what reason is meant, I do
not include this clause in my answer.

[127] [See above, p. 193. ED.]

[128] [Elsewhere, in speaking of 'reality' as "conceptual or perceptual
experiences," the author says: "This is meant merely to exclude reality
of an 'unknowable' sort, of which no account