ysical movement can have direction until its
goal is actually reached.

At this point does it not seem as if the quarrel about
self-transcendency in knowledge might drop? Is it not a purely verbal
dispute? Call it self-transcendency or call it pointing, whichever you
like--it makes no difference so long as real transitions towards real
goals are admitted as things given _in_ experience, and among
experience's most indefeasible parts. Radical empiricism, unable to
close its eyes to the transitions caught _in actu_, accounts for the
self-transcendency or the pointing (whichever you may call it) as a
process that occurs within experience, as an empirically mediated thing
of which a perfectly definite description can be given. 'Epistemology,'
on the other hand, denies this; and pretends that the self-transcendency
is unmediated or, if mediated, then mediated in a super-empirical world.
To justify this pretension, epistemology has first to transform all our
conjunctions into static objects, and this, I submit, is an absolutely
arbitrary act. But in spite of Mr. Bode's mal-treatment of conjunctions,
as I understand them--and as I understand him--I believe that at bottom
we are fighting for nothing different, but are both defending the same
continuities of experience in different forms of words.

There are other criticisms in the article in question, but, as this
seems the most vital one, I will for the present, at any rate, leave
them untouched.

FOOTNOTES:

[119] [Reprinted from _The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and
Scientific Methods_, vol. II, No. 9, April 27, 1905.]

[120] [B. H. Bode: "'Pure Experience' and the External World," _Journal
of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, vol. II, 1905, p.
128.]

[121] Vol. II, [1905], pp. 85-92.

X

MR. PITKIN'S REFUTATION OF 'RADICAL EMPIRICISM'[122]

Although Mr. Pitkin does not name me in his acute article on radical
empiricism,[123] [...] I fear that some readers, knowing me to have
applied that name to my own doctrine, may possibly consider themselves
to have been in at my death.

In point of fact my withers are entirely unwrung. I have, indeed,
said[124] that 'to be radical, an empiricism must not admit into its
constructions any element that is not directly experienced.' But in my
own radical empiricism this is only a _methodological postulate_, not a
conclusion supposed to flow from the intrinsic absurdity of
transempirical objects. I ha