onsequently, properly speaking, is not subject to our command. But
some things which are apprehended do not convince the intellect to
such an extent as not to leave it free to assent or dissent, or at
least suspend its assent or dissent, on account of some cause or
other; and in such things assent or dissent is in our power, and is
subject to our command.
Reply Obj. 1: Reason commands itself, just as the will moves itself,
as stated above (Q. 9, A. 3), that is to say, in so far as each power
reacts on its own acts, and from one thing tends to another.
Reply Obj. 2: On account of the diversity of objects subject to the
act of the reason, nothing prevents the reason from participating in
itself: thus the knowledge of principles is participated in the
knowledge of the conclusions.
The reply to the third object is evident from what has been said.
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SEVENTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 7]
Whether the Act of the Sensitive Appetite Is Commanded?
Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the sensitive appetite is
not commanded. For the Apostle says (Rom. 7:15): "For I do not that
good which I will": and a gloss explains this by saying that man
lusts, although he wills not to lust. But to lust is an act of the
sensitive appetite. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is
not subject to our command.
Obj. 2: Further, corporeal matter obeys God alone, to the effect of
formal transmutation, as was shown in the First Part (Q. 65, A. 4; Q.
91, A. 2; Q. 110, A. 2). But the act of the sensitive appetite is
accompanied by a formal transmutation of the body, consisting in heat
or cold. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not subject
to man's command.
Obj. 3: Further, the proper motive principle of the sensitive
appetite is something apprehended by sense or imagination. But it is
not always in our power to apprehend something by sense or
imagination. Therefore the act of the sensitive appetite is not
subject to our command.
_On the contrary,_ Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xvi.]
says: "That which obeys reason is twofold, the concupiscible and the
irascible," which belong to the sensitive appetite. Therefore the act
of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason.
_I answer that,_ An act is subject to our command, in so far as it is
in our power, as stated above (A. 5). Consequently in order to
understand in what manner the act of the sensitive appetite is
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