hat act is
commanded which is subject to reason. Now the first act of the will
is not due to the direction of the reason but to the instigation of
nature, or of a higher cause, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 4).
Therefore there is no need to proceed to infinity.
________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 17, Art. 6]

Whether the Act of the Reason Is Commanded?

Objection 1: It would seem that the act of the reason cannot be
commanded. For it seems impossible for a thing to command itself. But
it is the reason that commands, as stated above (A. 1). Therefore the
act of the reason is not commanded.

Obj. 2: Further, that which is essential is different from that which
is by participation. But the power whose act is commanded by reason,
is rational by participation, as stated in _Ethic._ i, 13. Therefore
the act of that power, which is essentially rational, is not
commanded.

Obj. 3: Further, that act is commanded, which is in our power. But to
know and judge the truth, which is the act of reason, is not always
in our power. Therefore the act of the reason cannot be commanded.

_On the contrary,_ That which we do of our free-will, can be done by
our command. But the acts of the reason are accomplished through the
free-will: for Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that "by his
free-will man inquires, considers, judges, approves." Therefore the
acts of the reason can be commanded.

_I answer that,_ Since the reason reacts on itself, just as it
directs the acts of other powers, so can it direct its own act.
Consequently its act can be commanded.

But we must take note that the act of the reason may be considered in
two ways. First, as to the exercise of the act. And considered thus,
the act of the reason can always be commanded: as when one is told to
be attentive, and to use one's reason. Secondly, as to the object; in
respect of which two acts of the reason have to be noticed. One is
the act whereby it apprehends the truth about something. This act is
not in our power: because it happens in virtue of a natural or
supernatural light. Consequently in this respect, the act of the
reason is not in our power, and cannot be commanded. The other act of
the reason is that whereby it assents to what it apprehends. If,
therefore, that which the reason apprehends is such that it naturally
assents thereto, e.g. the first principles, it is not in our power to
assent or dissent to the like: assent follows naturally, and
c