merchant vessels, and those not valuable," he
congratulated himself with justice upon success on the defensive
side.[421] The full effect was produced, which he had anticipated from
the mere fact of a strong American division being at large, but seen
so near its own shores that nothing certain could be inferred as to
its movements or intentions. The "Belvidera," having lost sight of it
at midnight, could, upon her arrival in Halifax, give only the general
information that it was at sea; and Captain Byron, who commanded her,
thought with reason that the "President's" action warranted the
conclusion that the anticipated hostilities had been begun. He
therefore seized and brought in two or three American merchantmen; but
the British admiral, Sawyer, thinking there might possibly be some
mistake, like that of the meeting between the "President" and "Little
Belt" a year before, directed their release.
A very few days later, definite intelligence of the declaration of war
by the United States was received at Halifax. At that period, the
American seas from the equator to Labrador were for administrative
purposes divided by the British Admiralty into four commands: two in
the West Indies, centring respectively at Jamaica and Barbados; one
at Newfoundland; while the fourth, with its two chief naval bases of
Halifax and Bermuda, lay over against the United States, and embraced
the Atlantic coast-line in its field of operations. Admiral Sawyer now
promptly despatched a squadron, consisting of one small ship of the
line and three frigates, the "Shannon", 38, "Belvidera", 36, and
"AEolus", 32, which sailed July 5. Four days later, off Nantucket, it
was joined by the "Guerriere", 38, and July 14 arrived off Sandy Hook.
There Captain Broke, of the "Shannon", who by seniority of rank
commanded the whole force, "received the first intelligence of
Rodgers' squadron having put to sea."[422] As an American division of
some character had been known to be out since the "Belvidera" met it,
and as Rodgers on this particular day was within two days' sail of the
English Channel, the entire ignorance of the enemy as to his
whereabouts could not be more emphatically stated. The components of
the British force were such that no two of them could justifiably
venture to encounter his united command. Consequently, to remain
together was imposed as a military necessity, and it so continued for
some weeks. In fact, the first separation, that of the "G
|