[447] Canadian Archives MSS. C. 676, p. 177.

[448] Ibid., p. 242.

[449] Hull's Trial. Evidence of Lieutenant Gooding, p. 101, and of
Sergeant Forbush, p. 147 (prisoners in Malden).

[450] Life of Brock, p. 250.

[451] Letter of Colonel Cass to U.S. Secretary of War, Sept. 10, 1812.
Hull's Trial, Appendix, p. 27.

[452] Life of Brock, p. 267.

[453] Hull's Trial. Defence, p. 20.

[454] Hull's Trial. Testimony of Captain Eastman, p. 100, and of
Dalliby, Ordnance Officer, p. 84.

[455] Ibid. Hull's Defence, pp. 59-60.

[456] Madison to Dearborn, Oct. 7, 1812. Writings, vol. ii, p. 547.

CHAPTER VII

OPERATIONS ON THE NORTHERN FRONTIER AFTER HULL'S SURRENDER.
EUROPEAN EVENTS BEARING ON THE WAR

By August 25, nine days after the capitulation of Detroit, Brock was
again writing from Fort George, by Niagara. About the time of his
departure for Malden, Prevost had received from Foster, late British
minister to Washington, and now in Nova Scotia, letters foreshadowing
the repeal of the Orders in Council. In consequence he had sent his
adjutant-general, Colonel Baynes, to Dearborn to negotiate a
suspension of hostilities. Like all intelligent flags of truce, Baynes
kept his eyes wide open to indications in the enemy's lines. The
militia, he reported, were not uniformed; they were distinguished from
other people of the country only by a cockade. The regulars were
mostly recruits. The war was unpopular, the great majority impatient
to return to their homes; a condition Brock observed also in the
Canadians. They avowed a fixed determination not to pass the frontier.
Recruiting for the regular service went on very slowly, though pay and
bounty were liberal. Dearborn appeared over sixty, strong and healthy,
but did not seem to possess the energy of mind or activity of body
requisite to his post. In short, from the actual state of the American
forces assembled on Lake Champlain, Baynes did not think there was any
intention of invasion. From its total want of discipline and order,
the militia could not be considered formidable when opposed to
well-disciplined British regulars.[457] Of this prognostic the war was
to furnish sufficient saddening proof. The militia contained excellent
material for soldiers, but soldiers they were not.

Dearborn declined to enter into a formal armistice, as beyond his
powers; but he consented to a cessation of hostilities pending a
reference to Washington, agreeing to direct all c