dred and fifty. More than half
his command was now thirty miles away from the position assigned it,
without other base of retreat or support than the remnant left at the
Rapids. In this situation a superior force of British and Indians
under Procter crossed the lake on the ice and attacked the party thus
rashly advanced to Frenchtown, which was compelled to surrender by 8
A.M. of January 22.
[Illustration: MAP OF LAKE FRONTIER TO ILLUSTRATE CAMPAIGNS OF
1812-1814]
Winchester had notified Harrison of his proposed action, but not in
such time as to permit it to be countermanded. Receiving the news on
the morning of January 19, Harrison at once recognized the hazardous
nature of the step, and ordered forward troops from Upper and Lower
Sandusky; proceeding himself to the latter place, and thence to the
Rapids, which he reached early on the 20th, ahead of the
re-enforcements. There was nothing to do but await developments until
the men from Sandusky arrived. At noon of the 22d he received
intelligence of the surrender, and saw that, through the imprudence of
his subordinate, his project of crossing the ice to attack the enemy
had been crushed by Procter, who had practically annihilated one of
his principal divisions, beating it in detail.
The loss of so large a part of the force upon which he had counted,
and the spread of sickness among the remainder, arrested Harrison's
projects of offensive action. The Maumee even was abandoned for a few
days, the army falling back to Portage River, toward the Sandusky. It
soon, however, returned to the Rapids, and there Fort Meigs was built,
which in the sequel proved sufficient to hold the position against
Procter's attack. The army of the Northwest from that time remained
purely on the defensive until the following September, when Perry's
victory, assuring the control of the lake, enabled it to march secure
of its communications.
Whatever chance of success may attend such a dash as that against
Malden, planned by Harrison in December, or open to Hull in August,
the undertaking is essentially outside the ordinary rules of warfare,
and to be justified only by the special circumstances of the case,
together with the possibility of securing the results obtained.
Frenchtown, as a particular enterprise, illustrates in some measure
the case of Malden. It was victoriously possessed, but under
conditions which made its tenure more than doubtful, and the loss of
the expedition
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