troops, supplies, and ammunition, rapidity of movement
from point to point, central position and interior lines--all depended
upon the control of the water, from Mackinac to the rapids of the St.
Lawrence.
This truth, announced before the war by Hull and Armstrong, as well as
by Harrison somewhat later, and sufficiently obvious to any thoughtful
man, was recognized in act by Harrison and the Government after the
Frenchtown disaster. The general was not responsible for the blunder
of his subordinate, nor am I able to see that his general plans for a
land campaign, considered independent of the water, lacked either
insight, judgment, or energy. He unquestionably made very rash
calculations, and indulged in wildly sanguine assurances of success;
but this was probably inevitable in the atmosphere in which he had to
work. The obstacles to be overcome were so enormous, the people and
the Government, militarily, so ignorant and incapable, that it was
scarcely possible to move efficiently without adopting, or seeming to
adopt, the popular spirit and conviction. Facts had now asserted
themselves through the unpleasant medium of experience, and henceforth
it was tacitly accepted that nothing could be done except to stand on
the defensive, until the navy of Lake Erie, as yet unbuilt, could
exert its power. Until that day came, even the defensive positions
taken were rudely shaken by Procter, a far from efficient officer,
but possessed still of the power of the lakes, and following, though
over-feebly, the spirit of Brock's instructions, to attack the enemy's
posts and keep things in a ferment.
With the Frenchtown affair hostilities on the Canada frontier ceased
until the following April; but the winter months were not therefore
passed in inactivity. Chauncey, after laying up his ships at Sackett's
Harbor, and representing to the Government the danger to them and to
the navy yard, now that frost had extended over the waters the
solidity of the ground, enabling the enemy to cross at will, departed
to visit his hitherto neglected command on Lake Erie. He had already
seen cause to be dissatisfied with Elliott's choice of a navy yard,
known usually by the name Black Rock, a quarter of a mile above Squaw
Island. The hostile shores were here so close together that even
musketry could be exchanged; and Elliott, when reporting his decision,
said "the river is so narrow that the soldiers are shooting at each
other across." There was th
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