nate for Great Britain, and most unfavorable to
the United States, that the moment of war, vainly sought to be avoided
by both parties, coincided with the first rude jar to Napoleon's
empire and its speedy final collapse; leaving the Union, weakened by
internal dissension, exposed single-handed to the full force of the
British power. At the beginning, however, and till toward the end of
1812, it seemed possible that for an indefinite period the efforts of
the Americans would receive the support derived from the inevitable
preoccupation of their enemy with European affairs; nor did many doubt
Napoleon's success against Russia, or that it would be followed by
Great Britain's abandoning the European struggle as hopeless.

For such maritime and political contingencies the British Admiralty
had to prepare, when the near prospect of war with America threatened
to add to the extensive responsibilities entailed by the long strife
with Napoleon. Its measures reflected the double purpose of the
Government: to secure peace, if possible, yet not to surrender
policies considered imperative. On May 9, 1812, identical instructions
were issued to each of the admirals commanding the four transatlantic
stations,--Newfoundland, Halifax, Jamaica, and Barbados,--warning them
of the imminent probability of hostilities, in the event of which, by
aggressive action or formal declaration on the part of the United
States, they were authorized to resort at once to all customary
procedures of war; "to attack, take or sink, burn or destroy, all
ships or vessels belonging to the United States or to the citizens
thereof." At the same time, however, special stress was laid upon the
urgent wish of the Government to avoid occasions which might induce a
collision. "You are to direct the commanders of his Majesty's ships to
exercise, except in the events hereinbefore specified, all possible
forbearance toward the United States, and to contribute, as far as may
depend upon them, to that good understanding which it is his Royal
Highness's[488] most earnest wish to maintain."[489] The spirit of
these orders, together with caution not to be attacked unawares,
accounts for the absence of British ships of war from the neighborhood
of the American coast noted by Rodgers' cruising squadron in the
spring of 1812. Decatur, indeed, was informed by a British naval agent
that the admiral at Bermuda did not permit more than two vessels to
cruise at a time, and these wer