r his arrival he represented the
reduced state of the squadron: "The war assumes a new, as well as more
active and inveterate aspect than heretofore." Alarming reports were
being received as to the number of ships of twenty-two to thirty-two
guns fitting out in American ports, and he mentions as significant
that the commission of a privateer officer, taken in a recaptured
vessel, bore the number 318. At Halifax he was in an atmosphere of
rumors and excitement, fed by frequent communication with eastern
ports, as well as by continual experience of captures about the
neighboring shores; the enemies' crews even landing at times. When he
went to Bermuda two months later, so many privateers were met on the
line of traffic between the West Indies and the St. Lawrence as to
convince him of the number and destructiveness of these vessels, and
"of the impossibility of our trade navigating these seas unless a very
extensive squadron is employed to scour the vicinity." He was crippled
for attempting this by the size of the American frigates, which
forbade his dispersing his cruisers. The capture of the "Guerriere"
had now been followed by that of the "Macedonian;" and in view of the
results, and of Rodgers being again out, he felt compelled to
constitute squadrons of two frigates and a sloop. Under these
conditions, and with so many convoys to furnish, "it is impracticable
to cut off the enemy's resources, or to repress the disorder and
pillage which actually exist to a very alarming degree, both on the
coast of British America and in the West Indies, as will be seen by
the copies of letters enclosed," from colonial and naval officials. He
goes on to speak, in terms not carefully weighed, of swarms of
privateers and letters-of-marque, their numbers now amounting to six
hundred; the crews of which had landed in many points of his Majesty's
dominions, and even taken vessels from their anchors in British
ports.[512]

The Admiralty, while evidently seeing exaggeration in this language,
bear witness in their reply to the harassment caused by the American
squadrons and private armed ships. They remind the admiral that there
are two principal ways of protecting the trade: one by furnishing it
with convoys, the other by preventing egress from the enemy's ports,
through adequate force placed before them. To disperse vessels over
the open sea, along the tracks of commerce, though necessary, is but
a subsidiary measure. His true course is t