FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337  
338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   >>  
ary corps more than probable. Furthermore, if held, it conferred no advantage. The position was less defensible than the Maumee, more exposed because nearer the enemy, more difficult to maintain because the communications were thirty miles longer, and, finally, it controlled nothing. The name of occupation, applied to it, was a mere misnomer, disguising a sham. Malden, on the contrary, if effectually held, would confer a great benefit; for in the hands of an enemy it menaced the communications of Detroit, and if coupled with command of the water, as was the case, it controlled them, as Hull found to his ruin. To gain it, therefore, justified a good deal of risk; yet if seized, unless control of the water were also soon established, it would, as compared with Detroit, entail upon the Americans the additional disadvantage that Frenchtown incurred over the Maumee,--an increase of exposure, because of longer and more exposed lines of communication. Though Malden was valuable to the British as a local base, with all the benefits of nearness, it was not the only one they possessed on the lakes. The loss of it, therefore, so long as they possessed decided superiority in armed shipping, though a great inconvenience, would not be a positive disability. With the small tonnage they had on the lake, however, it would have become extremely difficult, if not impossible, to transport and maintain a force sufficient seriously to interrupt the road from the Maumee, upon which Detroit depended. In short, in all ordinary warfare, and in most that is extraordinary and seems outside the rules, one principle is sure to enforce itself with startling emphasis, if momentarily lost to sight or forgotten, and that is the need of secured communications. A military body, land or sea, may abandon its communications for a brief period, strictly limited, expecting soon to restore them at the same or some other point, just as a caravan can start across the desert with food and water which will last until another base is reached. There is no surrender of certainty in such a case; but a body of troops thrown into a position where it has no security of receiving supplies, incurs a risk that needs justification, and can receive it only from special circumstances. No position within striking distance of the lake shore was permanently secure unless supported by naval power; because all that is implied by the term "communications"--facility for transporting
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   313   314   315   316   317   318   319   320   321   322   323   324   325   326   327   328   329   330   331   332   333   334   335   336   337  
338   339   340   341   342   343   344   345   346   347   348   349   350   351   352   353   354   355   356   357   358   359   360   361   >>  



Top keywords:

communications

 

Detroit

 
position
 

Maumee

 
possessed
 

Malden

 

longer

 
controlled
 

maintain

 

difficult


exposed

 

warfare

 

abandon

 
limited
 

expecting

 

restore

 
strictly
 

period

 

ordinary

 

enforce


forgotten
 

startling

 
emphasis
 
momentarily
 

principle

 
extraordinary
 

military

 

secured

 

surrender

 

special


receive

 

circumstances

 

justification

 
security
 

receiving

 

supplies

 

incurs

 

striking

 

distance

 

implied


facility

 

transporting

 
permanently
 

secure

 

supported

 

desert

 

caravan

 

troops

 

thrown

 
certainty