is done, and the Black Rock vessels thus released,
there still remained the bar at Erie to pass. The British force on
Ontario was likewise divided, between Toronto and Kingston, the vessels
afloat being at the latter. Neither place, however, was under such
fetters as Black Rock, and the two divisions might very possibly be
assembled despite the hostile fleet. On the upper lake their navy was at
Amherstburg, where also was building a ship, inferior in force, despite
her rig, to either of the brigs ordered by Chauncey at Erie. The
difficulties of obtaining supplies, mechanics, and seamen, in that then
remote region, imposed great hindrances upon the general British
preparations. There nevertheless remained in their hands, at the opening
of the campaign, the great advantages over the Americans--first, of the
separation of the latter's divisions, enforced by the British holding
the bank of the Niagara; and secondly, of the almost insuperable
difficulty of crossing the Erie bar unarmed, if the enemy's fleet kept
in position near it. That the British failed to sustain these original
advantages condemns their management, and is far more a matter of
military criticism than the relative power of the two squadrons in the
battle of September 10. The principal business of each commander was to
be stronger than the enemy when they met. That the American accomplished
this, despite serious obstacles, first by concentrating his force, and
second by crossing the bar unimpeded, so that when he encountered his
opponent he was in decisively superior force, is as distinctly to his
credit as it would have been distinctly to his discredit had the odds
been reversed by any fault of his. Perry by diligent efficiency overcame
his difficulties, combined his divisions, gained the lake, and, by
commanding it, so cut off his enemy's supplies that he compelled him to
come out, and fight, and be destroyed. To compare the force of the two
may be a matter of curious interest; but for the purpose of making
comparisons of desert between them it is a mere waste of ink, important
only to those who conceive the chief end of war to be fighting, and not
victory.

* * * * *

The disaster at Frenchtown, with the consequent abandonment of all
project of forward movement by the Army of the Northwest, may be
regarded as the definite termination of the land campaign of 1812.
Before resuming the account of the ocean operations of the s