rn seas extended to the Straits of Sunda, and beyond. From
Antwerp to Venice, in various ports, when the Empire fell, Napoleon
had over a hundred ships of the line and half a hundred frigates. To
hold these in check was in itself a heavy task for the British sea
power, even though most of the colonial ports which might serve as
bases for their external action had been wrested from France. A
hostile America would open to the French navy a number of harbors
which it now needed; and at the will of the Emperor the United States
might receive a division of ships of a class she lacked entirely, but
could both officer and man. One of Napoleon's great wants was seamen,
and it was perfectly understood by intelligent naval officers, and by
appreciative statesmen like John Adams and Gouverneur Morris, that a
fleet of ships of the line, based upon American resources, would
constitute for Great Britain a more difficult problem than a vastly
larger number in Europe. The probability was contemplated by both the
British Commander-in-Chief and the Admiralty, and was doubtless a
chief reason for the comparatively large number of ships of the
line--eleven--assigned on the outbreak of hostilities to a station
where otherwise there was no similar force to encounter.[486] To bring
the French ships and this coast-line together was a combination
correct in conception, and not impracticable. It was spoken of at the
time--rumored as a design; and had not the attention and the means of
the Emperor been otherwise preoccupied, probably would have been
attempted, and not impossibly effected.

To avert such a conjuncture by the restoration of peace was
necessarily an object of British policy. More than that, however, was
at stake. The Orders in Council had served their turn. In conjunction
with Napoleon's Continental System, by the misery inflicted upon all
the countries under his control, they had brought about the
desperation of Russia and the resistance of the Czar, who at first had
engaged in the Emperor's policy. Russia and France were at war, and it
was imperative at once to redouble the pressure in the Peninsula, and
to recuperate the financial strength of Great Britain, by opening
every possible avenue of supply and of market to British trade, in
order to bring the whole national power, economical and military, to
bear effectively upon what promised to be a death struggle. The repeal
of the Orders, with the consequent admission of American me