forest."[472] It seems scarcely necessary to point
the moral, which he naturally did not draw for the edification of his
superiors in the Administration, that a like energy displayed on Lake
Erie, when war was contemplated, would have placed Hull's enterprise
on the same level of security that was obtained for his successor by
Perry's victory a year later, and at much less cost.

With the laying up of the fleet on the lakes operations on the
northern frontier closed, except in the far West, where General
Harrison succeeded to the command after Hull's capitulation. The loss
of Detroit had thrown the American front of operations back upon the
Maumee; nor would that, perhaps, have been tenable, had conditions in
Upper Canada permitted Brock to remain with the most of his force
through August and September. As it was, just apprehension for the
Niagara line compelled his return thither; and the same considerations
that decided the place of the Commander-in-Chief, dictated also that
of the mass of his troops. The command at Detroit and Malden was left
to Colonel Procter, whose position was defensively secured by naval
means; the ship "Queen Charlotte" and brig "Hunter" maintaining local
control of the water. He was, however, forbidden to attempt operations
distinctively offensive. "It must be explicitly understood," wrote
Brock to him, "that you are not to resort to offensive warfare for the
purposes of conquest. Your operations are to be confined to measures
of defence and security."[473] Among these, however, Brock included,
by direct mention, undertakings intended to destroy betimes
threatening gatherings of men or of stores; but such action was merely
to secure the British positions, on the principle, already noted, that
offence is the best defence. How far these restrictions represent
Brock's own wishes, or reflect simply the known views of Sir George
Prevost, the Governor General, is difficult to say. Brock's last
letter to Procter, written within a week of his death, directed that
the enemy should be kept in a state of constant ferment. It seems
probable, however, that Procter's force was not such as to warrant
movement with a view to permanent occupation beyond Detroit, the more
so as the roads were usually very bad; but any effort on the part of
the Americans to establish posts on the Maumee, or along the lake,
must be promptly checked, if possible, lest these should form bases
whence to march in force upon Detroit o