own itself in enlistments for the
army, which, the President wrote, "fall short of the most moderate
calculation." The attempt to supplement "regulars" by "volunteers,"
who, unlike the militia, should be under the General Government
instead of that of the States--a favorite resource always with the
Legislature of the United States--was "extremely unproductive;" while
the militia in service were not under obligation to leave their state,
and might, if they chose, abandon their fellow-countrymen outside its
limits to slaughter and capture, as they did at Niagara, without
incurring military punishment. The governors of the New England
States, being opposed to the war, refused to go a step beyond
protecting their own territory from hostilities, which they declared
were forced upon them by the Administration rather than by the
British. For this attitude there was a semblance of excuse in the
utter military inefficiency to which the policy of Jefferson and
Madison had reduced the national government. It was powerless to give
the several states the protection to which it was pledged by the
Constitution. The citizens of New York had to fortify and defend their
own harbor. The reproaches of New England on this score were seconded
somewhat later by the outcries of Maryland; and if Virginia was silent
under suffering, it was not because she lacked cause for complaint. It
is to be remembered that in the matter of military and naval
unpreparedness the great culprits were Virginians. South of Virginia
the nature of the shore line minimized the local harrying, from which
the northern part of the community suffered. Nevertheless, there also
the coasting trade was nearly destroyed, and even the internal
navigation seriously harassed.

Only on the Great Lakes had the case of the United States improved,
when winter put an end to most operations on the northern frontier. As
in the Civil War a half century later, so in 1812, the power of the
water over the issues of the land not only was not comprehended by the
average official, but was incomprehensible to him. Armstrong in
January, and Hull in March, had insisted upon a condition that should
have been obvious; but not till September 3, when Hull's disaster had
driven home Hull's reasoning, did Captain Chauncey receive orders "to
assume command of the naval force on lakes Erie and Ontario, and to use
every exertion to obtain control of them this fall." All preparations
had still to be made