th so large a
force."[441]

When Brock thus wrote, July 20, he was at Fort George, on the shore of
Ontario, near Niagara River, watching the frontier where he expected
the main attack. He had already struck his first blow. Immediately
upon being assured of the declaration of war, on June 28, he had
despatched a letter to St. Joseph's, directing all preparations to be
made for proceeding against Mackinac; the final determination as to
offensive or defensive action being very properly left to the officer
there in command. The latter, thus aware of his superior's wishes,
started July 16, with some six hundred men,--of whom four hundred were
Indians,--under convoy of the armed brig "Caledonia," belonging to the
Northwestern Fur Company. The next day he appeared before the American
post, where the existence of war was yet unknown. The garrison
numbered fifty-seven, including three officers; being about one third
the force reported necessary for the peace establishment by Mr.
Jefferson's Secretary of War, in 1801. The place was immediately
surrendered. Under all the conditions stated there is an entertaining
ingenuousness in the reference made to this disaster by President
Madison: "We have but just learned that the important post of
Michilimackinac has fallen into the hands of the enemy, but from what
cause remains to be known."[442]

Brock received this news at Toronto, July 29; but not till August 3 did
it reach Hull, by the arrival of the paroled prisoners. He was then on
the Canada side, at Sandwich, opposite Detroit; having crossed with
from fourteen to sixteen hundred men on July 12. This step was taken on
the strength of a discretionary order from the Secretary of War, that
if "the force under your command be equal to the enterprise, consistent
with the safety of your own post, you will take possession of Malden,
and extend your conquests as circumstances may justify." It must be
added, however, in justice to the Administration, that the same letter,
received July 9, three days before the crossing, contained the warning,
"It is also proper to inform you that an adequate force cannot soon be
relied on for the reduction of the enemy's posts below you."[443] This
bears on the question of Hull's expectation of support by diversion on
the Niagara frontier, and shows that he had fair notice on that score.
That over-confidence still possessed him seems apparent from a letter
to the secretary dated July 7, in which he said,