ostilities than the portion
behind the Maumee. Under these circumstances, Detroit itself was in
danger of an interruption of supplies and re-enforcements, amounting
possibly to isolation. It was open to the enemy to land in its rear,
secure of his own communications by water, and with a fair chance, in
case of failure, to retire by the way he came; for retreat could be
made safely in very small vessels or boats, so long as Malden was held
in force.
The reduction of Malden might therefore secure Detroit, by depriving
the enemy of a base suitable for using his lake power against its
communications. Unless this was accomplished, any advance beyond
Detroit with the force then at hand merely weakened that place, by
just the amount of men and means expended, and was increasingly
hazardous when it entailed crossing water. A sudden blow may snatch
safety under such conditions; but to attempt the slow and graduated
movements of a siege, with uncertain communications supporting it, is
to court disaster. The holding of Detroit being imperative, efforts
external to it should have been chiefly exerted on its rear, and upon
its front only to prevent the easy passage of the enemy. In short,
when Detroit was reached, barring the chance of a _coup de main_ upon
Malden, Hull's position needed to be made more solid, not more
extensive. As it was, the army remained at Sandwich, making abortive
movements toward the river Canard, which covered the approach to
Malden, and pushing small foraging parties up the valley of the
Thames. The greatest industry was used, Hull reported, in making
preparations to besiege, but it was not till August 7, nearly four
weeks after crossing, that the siege guns were ready; and then the
artillery officers reported that it would be extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to take them to Malden by land, and by water still
more so, because the ship of war "Queen Charlotte," carrying eighteen
24-pounders, lay off the mouth of the Canard, commanding the stream.
The first impression produced by the advance into Canada had been
propitious to Hull. He himself in his defence admitted that the
enemy's force had diminished, great part of their militia had left
them, and many of their Indians.[446] This information of the American
camp corresponded with the facts. Lieut. Colonel St. George,
commanding Fort Malden, reported the demoralized condition of his
militia. Three days after Hull crossed he had left but four hund
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