ans was essential. To preserve Upper Canada,
therefore, Michilimackinac and Detroit must be reduced. Otherwise the
savages could not be convinced that Great Britain would not sacrifice
them at a peace, as they believed her to have done in 1794, by Jay's
Treaty. In this he agreed with Hull, who faced the situation far more
efficiently than his superiors, and at the same moment was writing
officially, "The British cannot hold Upper Canada without the
assistance of the Indians, and that they cannot obtain if we have an
adequate force at Detroit."[436] Brock deemed it vital that
Amherstburg, nearly opposite Detroit, should be held in force; both to
resist the first hostile attack, and as a base whence to proceed to
offensive operations. He apprehended, and correctly, as the event
proved, that Niagara would be chosen by the Americans as the line for
their main body to penetrate with a view to conquest. This was his
defensive frontier; the western, the offensive wing of his campaign.
These leading ideas dictated his preparations, imperfect from paucity
of means, but sufficient to meet the limping, flaccid measures of the
United States authorities.

To this well-considered view the War Department of the United States
opposed no ordered plan of any kind, no mind prepared with even the
common precautions of every-day life. This unreadiness, plainly
manifested by its actions, was the more culpable because the
unfortunate Hull, in his letter of March 6, 1812, just quoted, a month
before his unwilling acceptance of his general's commission, had laid
clearly before it the leading features of the military and political
situation, recognized by him during his four years of office as
Governor of the Territory. In this cogent paper, amid numerous
illuminative details, he laid unmistakable emphasis on the decisive
influence of Detroit upon the whole Northwest, especially in
determining the attitude of the Indians. He dwelt also upon the
critical weakness of the communications on which the tenure of it
depended, and upon the necessity of naval superiority to secure them.
This expression of his opinion was in the hands of the Government over
three months before the declaration of war. As early as January,
however, Secretary Eustis had been warned by Armstrong, who
subsequently succeeded him in the War Department, that Detroit,
otherwise advantageous in position, "would be positively bad, unless
your naval means have an ascendency on Lake