the 'Monmouth,' her second ahead, and the
'Monarca,' her second astern. At half-past one the engagement
began in the van of both squadrons; three minutes after, I made
the signal for battle. The French admiral in the 'Heros' and his
second astern in 'L'Orient' (both seventy-fours) bore down on
the 'Superbe'[177] within pistol-shot. The 'Heros' continued in
her position, giving and receiving a severe fire for nine
minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the
'Monmouth,' at that time engaged with another of the enemy's
ships, making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the
attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest. At three
the 'Monmouth' had her mizzen-mast shot away, and in a few
minutes her mainmast, and bore out of the line to leeward (C,
c); and at forty minutes past three the wind unexpectedly
continuing far northerly without any sea-breeze, and being
careful not to entangle our ships with the land, I made signal
to wear and haul by the wind in a line-of-battle on the larboard
tack, still engaging the enemy."

Now here, practically, was concentration with a vengeance. In this,
the hardest fight between these two hard fighters, the English loss
was 137 killed and 430 wounded in eleven ships. Of this total, the two
centre ships, the flag-ship and her next ahead, lost 104 killed and
198 wounded,--fifty-three per cent of the entire loss of the squadron,
of which they formed eighteen per cent. The casualties were very much
heavier, in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the
leaders of the two columns at Trafalgar.[178] The material injury to
hulls, spars, etc., was yet more serious. The English squadron, by
this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction of it, was
entirely crippled. Inferior when the action began, its inferiority
was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two ships, and Suffren's
freedom to move was increased.

[Illustration: Pl. XV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. APRIL 12, 1782.]

But how far was this concentration intended by Suffren? For this we
must go to the pages of two French writers,[179] who base their
narratives upon his own despatches on record in the French Marine
Office. The practical advantage gained by the French must also be
tested by comparing the lists of casualties, and the injuries received
by their individual ships; for it is evident that if both the
squadrons rece