and quarter by two
French ships, who, either with or without signal, came up to shield
their commodore.

An examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss of the
French was much more distributed among their ships than was the case
with the English. No less than three of the latter escaped without a
man killed, while of the French only one. The kernel of the action
seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitous concentration of two
French seventy-fours and one sixty-four on an English seventy-four and
sixty-four. Assuming the ships to have been actually of the same force
as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside only, one
hundred and six guns against sixty-nine.

Some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management of Admiral
Hughes during the three days preceding the fight, because he refrained
from attacking the French, although they were for much of the time to
leeward with only one ship more than the English, and much separated
at that. It was thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in
detail.[184] The accounts accessible are too meagre to permit an
accurate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected the
mess-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate officers of the
fleet. Hughes's own report of the position of the two fleets is vague,
and in one important particular directly contradictory to the French.
If the alleged opportunity offered, the English admiral in declining
to use it adhered to the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to
seek nor shun the enemy, but to go directly to Trincomalee and land
the troops and supplies he had on board. In other words, he was
governed in his action by the French rather than the English naval
policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet to the
particular mission in hand. If for this reason he did allow a
favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had reason bitterly
to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle which followed;
but in the lack of precise information the most interesting point to
be noted is the impression made upon public and professional opinion,
indicating how strongly the English held that the attack of the
enemy's fleet was the first duty of an English admiral. It may also be
said that he could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by
allowing the enemy to become the assailant; and certainly not worse
than he would have fared had Suffren's captains been as good as h