t
he promised.

Nor is that knowledge, which is requisite to make mankind sensible
of this interest in the institution and observance of promises, to be
esteemed superior to the capacity of human nature, however savage and
uncultivated. There needs but a very little practice of the world, to
make us perceive all these consequences and advantages. The shortest
experience of society discovers them to every mortal; and when each
individual perceives the same sense of interest in all his fellows, he
immediately performs his part of any contract, as being assured, that
they will not be wanting in theirs. All of them, by concert, enter into
a scheme of actions, calculated for common benefit, and agree to be true
to their word; nor is there any thing requisite to form this concert or
convention, but that every one have a sense of interest in the faithful
fulfilling of engagements, and express that sense to other members of
the society. This immediately causes that interest to operate upon them;
and interest is the first obligation to the performance of promises.

Afterwards a sentiment of morals concurs with interest, and becomes
a new obligation upon mankind. This sentiment of morality, in the
performance of promises, arises from the same principles as that in the
abstinence from the property of others. Public interest, education, and
the artifices of politicians, have the same effect in both cases. The
difficulties, that occur to us, in supposing a moral obligation
to attend promises, we either surmount or elude. For instance; the
expression of a resolution is not commonly supposed to be obligatory;
and we cannot readily conceive how the making use of a certain form of
words should be able to cause any material difference. Here, therefore,
we feign a new act of the mind, which we call the willing an obligation;
and on this we suppose the morality to depend. But we have proved
already, that there is no such act of the mind, and consequently that
promises impose no natural obligation.

To confirm this, we may subjoin some other reflections concerning
that will, which is supposed to enter into a promise, and to cause its
obligation. It is evident, that the will alone is never supposed to
cause the obligation, but must be expressed by words or signs, in order
to impose a tye upon any man. The expression being once brought in as
subservient to the will, soon becomes the principal part of the promise;
nor will a man be less bou