of the obligation of a promise. Though the object of our civil
duties be the enforcing of our natural, yet the first [First in
time, not in dignity or force.] motive of the invention, as well as
performance of both, is nothing but self-interest: and since there is
a separate interest in the obedience to government, from that in the
performance of promises, we must also allow of a separate obligation. To
obey the civil magistrate is requisite to preserve order and concord
in society. To perform promises is requisite to beget mutual trust
and confidence in the common offices of life. The ends, as well as the
means, are perfectly distinct; nor is the one subordinate to the other.

To make this more evident, let us consider, that men will often bind
themselves by promises to the performance of what it would have been
their interest to perform, independent of these promises; as when they
would give others a fuller security, by super-adding a new obligation
of interest to that which they formerly lay under. The interest in
the performance of promises, besides its moral obligation, is general,
avowed, and of the last consequence in life. Other interests may be
more particular and doubtful; and we are apt to entertain a greater
suspicion, that men may indulge their humour, or passion, in acting
contrary to them. Here, therefore, promises come naturally in play, and
are often required for fuller satisfaction and security. But supposing
those other interests to be as general and avowed as the interest in the
performance of a promise, they will be regarded as on the same footing,
and men will begin to repose the same confidence in them. Now this is
exactly the case with regard to our civil duties, or obedience to the
magistrate; without which no government coued subsist, nor any peace
or order be maintained in large societies, where there are so many
possessions on the one hand, and so many wants, real or imaginary, on
the other. Our civil duties, therefore, must soon detach themselves from
our promises, and acquire a separate force and influence. The interest
in both is of the very same kind: It is general, avowed, and prevails in
all times and places. There is, then, no pretext of reason for founding
the one upon the other; while each of them has a foundation peculiar
to itself. We might as well resolve the obligation to abstain from the
possessions of others, into the obligation of a promise, as that of
allegiance. The interest