akes easily this direction, and chuses
that set of men for its objects. It is interest which gives the general
instinct; but it is custom which gives the particular direction.

And here it is observable, that the same length of time has a different
influence on our sentiments of morality, according to its different
influence on the mind. We naturally judge of every thing by comparison;
and since in considering the fate of kingdoms and republics, we embrace
a long extent of time, a small duration has not in this case a like
influence on our sentiments, as when we consider any other object. One
thinks he acquires a right to a horse, or a suit of cloaths, in a very
short time; but a century is scarce sufficient to establish any
new government, or remove all scruples in the minds of the subjects
concerning it. Add to this, that a shorter period of time will suffice
to give a prince a title to any additional power he may usurp, than will
serve to fix his right, where the whole is an usurpation. The kings of
France have not been possessed of absolute power for above two reigns;
and yet nothing will appear more extravagant to Frenchmen than to
talk of their liberties. If we consider what has been said concerning
accession, we shall easily account for this phaenomenon.

When there is no form of government established by long possession,
the present possession is sufficient to supply its place, and may
be regarded as the second source of all public authority. Right
to authority is nothing but the constant possession of authority,
maintained by the laws of society and the interests of mankind; and
nothing can be more natural than to join this constant possession to the
present one, according to the principles above-mentioned. If the same
principles did not take place with regard to the property of private
persons, it was because these principles were counter-ballanced by
very strong considerations of interest; when we observed, that all
restitution would by that means be prevented, and every violence be
authorized and protected. And though the same motives may seem to
have force, with regard to public authority, yet they are opposed by a
contrary interest; which consists in the preservation of peace, and the
avoiding of all changes, which, however they may be easily produced in
private affairs, are unavoidably attended with bloodshed and confusion,
where the public is interested.

Any one, who finding the impossibility of accou