and interest being different, it is impossible men
coued ever agree in their sentiments and judgments, unless they chose
some common point of view, from which they might survey their object,
and which might cause it to appear the same to all of them. Now in
judging of characters, the only interest or pleasure, which appears the
same to every spectator, is that of the person himself, whose character
is examined; or that of persons, who have a connexion with him. And
though such interests and pleasures touch us more faintly than our own,
yet being more constant and universal, they counter-ballance the latter
even in practice, and are alone admitted in speculation as the standard
of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or
sentiment, on which moral distinctions depend.
As to the good or ill desert of virtue or vice, it is an evident
consequence of the sentiments of pleasure or uneasiness. These
sentiments produce love or hatred; and love or hatred, by the original
constitution of human passion, is attended with benevolence or anger;
that is, with a desire of making happy the person we love, and miserable
the person we hate. We have treated of this more fully on another
occasion.
SECT. II OF GREATNESS OF MIND
It may now be proper to illustrate this general system of morals, by
applying it to particular instances of virtue and vice, and shewing how
their merit or demerit arises from the four sources here explained. We
shall begin with examining the passions of pride and humility, and
shall consider the vice or virtue that lies in their excesses or just
proportion. An excessive pride or overweaning conceit of ourselves is
always esteemed vicious, and is universally hated; as modesty, or a just
sense of our weakness, is esteemed virtuous, and procures the good-will
of every-one. Of the four sources of moral distinctions, this is to
be ascribed to the third; viz, the immediate agreeableness and
disagreeableness of a quality to others, without any reflections on the
tendency of that quality.
In order to prove this, we must have recourse to two principles,
which are very conspicuous in human nature. The first of these is the
sympathy, and communication of sentiments and passions above-mentioned.
So close and intimate is the correspondence of human souls, that
no sooner any person approaches me, than he diffuses on me all his
opinions, and draws along my judgment in a greater or lesser deg
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