er identity and simplicity of a self or thinking being.

When we talk of self or substance, we must have an idea annexed to
these terms, otherwise they are altogether unintelligible. Every idea is
derived from preceding impressions; and we have no impression of self
or substance, as something simple and individual. We have, therefore, no
idea of them in that sense.

Whatever is distinct, is distinguishable; and whatever is
distinguishable, is separable by the thought or imagination. All
perceptions are distinct. They are, therefore, distinguishable, and
separable, and may be conceived as separately existent, and may exist
separately, without any contradiction or absurdity.

When I view this table and that chimney, nothing is present to me but
particular perceptions, which are of a like nature with all the other
perceptions. This is the doctrine of philosophers. But this table, which
is present to me, and the chimney, may and do exist separately. This is
the doctrine of the vulgar, and implies no contradiction. There is no
contradiction, therefore, in extending the same doctrine to all the
perceptions.

In general, the following reasoning seems satisfactory. All ideas are
borrowed from preceding perceptions. Our ideas of objects, therefore,
are derived from that source. Consequently no proposition can be
intelligible or consistent with regard to objects, which is not so with
regard to perceptions. But it is intelligible and consistent to say,
that objects exist distinct and independent, without any common simple
substance or subject of inhesion. This proposition, therefore, can never
be absurd with regard to perceptions.

When I turn my reflection on myself, I never can perceive this self
without some one or more perceptions; nor can I ever perceive any thing
but the perceptions. It is the composition of these, therefore, which
forms the self. We can conceive a thinking being to have either many or
few perceptions. Suppose the mind to be reduced even below the life
of an oyster. Suppose it to have only one perception, as of thirst or
hunger. Consider it in that situation. Do you conceive any thing but
merely that perception? Have you any notion of self or substance? If
not, the addition of other perceptions can never give you that notion.

The annihilation, which some people suppose to follow upon death, and
which entirely destroys this self, is nothing but an extinction of all
particular perceptions; love and hatr