FREE BOOKS

Author's List




PREV.   NEXT  
|<   533   534   535   536   537   538   539   540   541   542   543   544   545   546   547   548   549   >>  
ation, which arises from the survey of all those virtues, that are useful to society, or to the person possessed of them. These form the most considerable part of morality. Were it proper in such a subject to bribe the reader's assent, or employ any thing but solid argument, we are here abundantly supplied with topics to engage the affections. All lovers of virtue (and such we all are in speculation, however we may degenerate in practice) must certainly be pleased to see moral distinctions derived from so noble a source, which gives us a just notion both of the generosity and capacity of human nature. It requires but very little knowledge of human affairs to perceive, that a sense of morals is a principle inherent in the soul, and one of the most powerful that enters into the composition. But this sense must certainly acquire new force, when reflecting on itself, it approves of those principles, from whence it is derived, and finds nothing but what is great and good in its rise and origin. Those who resolve the sense of morals into original instincts of the human mind, may defend the cause of virtue with sufficient authority; but want the advantage, which those possess, who account for that sense by an extensive sympathy with mankind. According to their system, not only virtue must be approved of, but also the sense of virtue: And not only that sense, but also the principles, from whence it is derived. So that nothing is presented on any side, but what is laudable and good. This observation may be extended to justice, and the other virtues of that kind. Though justice be artificial, the sense of its morality is natural. It is the combination of men, in a system of conduct, which renders any act of justice beneficial to society. But when once it has that tendency, we naturally approve of it; and if we did not so, it is impossible any combination or convention coued ever produce that sentiment. Most of the inventions of men are subject to change. They depend upon humour and caprice. They have a vogue for a time, and then sink into oblivion. It may, perhaps, be apprehended, that if justice were allowed to be a human invention, it must be placed on the same footing. But the cases are widely different. The interest, on which justice is founded, is the greatest imaginable, and extends to all times and places. It cannot possibly be served by any other invention. It is obvious, and discovers itself on the very first forma
PREV.   NEXT  
|<   533   534   535   536   537   538   539   540   541   542   543   544   545   546   547   548   549   >>  



Top keywords:

justice

 

virtue

 

derived

 

morals

 

combination

 

invention

 
system
 

principles

 
virtues
 

subject


society

 
morality
 
conduct
 
beneficial
 

renders

 
tendency
 

convention

 
impossible
 

naturally

 

approve


survey
 

natural

 

presented

 

possessed

 

approved

 

laudable

 

Though

 

artificial

 
produce
 

person


observation

 

extended

 

sentiment

 

interest

 

founded

 

greatest

 

imaginable

 

footing

 
widely
 
extends

discovers
 

obvious

 
served
 
places
 

possibly

 
humour
 

caprice

 

depend

 

arises

 
inventions