an the most unerring judgment. A man,
who is free from mistakes, can pretend to no praises, except from the
justness of his understanding: But a man, who corrects his mistakes,
shews at once the justness of his understanding, and the candour and
ingenuity of his temper. I have not yet been so fortunate as to discover
any very considerable mistakes in the reasonings delivered in
the preceding volumes, except on one article: But I have found by
experience, that some of my expressions have not been so well chosen,
as to guard against all mistakes in the readers; and it is chiefly to
remedy this defect, I have subjoined the following appendix.

We can never be induced to believe any matter of fact, except where its
cause, or its effect, is present to us; but what the nature is of that
belief, which arises from the relation of cause and effect, few have
had the curiosity to ask themselves. In my opinion, this dilemma is
inevitable. Either the belief is some new idea, such as that of reality
or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an object, or
it is merely a peculiar feeling or sentiment. That it is not a new
idea, annexed to the simple conception, may be evinced from these two
arguments. First, We have no abstract idea of existence, distinguishable
and separable from the idea of particular objects. It is impossible,
therefore, that this idea of existence can be annexed to the idea of any
object, or form the difference betwixt a simple conception and belief.
Secondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate,
unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted
merely in a new idea, annexed to the conception, it would be in a man's
power to believe what he pleased. We may, therefore, conclude, that
belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something,
that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate
causes and principles, of which we are not masters. When we are
convinced of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along
with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere reveries
of the imagination. And when we express our incredulity concerning any
fact, we mean, that the arguments for the fact produce not that feeling.
Did not the belief consist in a sentiment different from our mere
conception, whatever objects were presented by the wildest imagination,
would be on an equal footing with the most established trut