here observe a double rebound
of the sympathy; which is a principle very similar to what we have
observed. [Book II. Part II. Sect. V.]
SECT. III OF GOODNESS AND BENEVOLENCE
Having thus explained the origin of that praise and approbation, which
attends every thing we call great in human affections; we now proceed to
give an account of their goodness, and shew whence its merit is derived.
When experience has once given us a competent knowledge of human
affairs, and has taught us the proportion they bear to human passion, we
perceive, that the generosity of men is very limited, and that it seldom
extends beyond their friends and family, or, at most, beyond their
native country. Being thus acquainted with the nature of man, we expect
not any impossibilities from him; but confine our view to that narrow
circle, in which any person moves, in order to form a judgment of his
moral character. When the natural tendency of his passions leads him
to be serviceable and useful within his sphere, we approve of his
character, and love his person, by a sympathy with the sentiments of
those, who have a more particular connexion with him. We are quickly
obliged to forget our own interest in our judgments of this kind, by
reason of the perpetual contradictions, we meet with in society and
conversation, from persons that are not placed in the same situation,
and have not the same interest with ourselves. The only point of
view, in which our sentiments concur with those of others, is, when we
consider the tendency of any passion to the advantage or harm of
those, who have any immediate connexion or intercourse with the person
possessed of it. And though this advantage or harm be often very remote
from ourselves, yet sometimes it is very near us, and interests us
strongly by sympathy. This concern we readily extend to other cases,
that are resembling; and when these are very remote, our sympathy
is proportionably weaker, and our praise or blame fainter and more
doubtful. The case is here the same as in our judgments concerning
external bodies. All objects seem to diminish by their distance: But
though the appearance of objects to our senses be the original standard,
by which we judge of them, yet we do not say, that they actually
diminish by the distance; but correcting the appearance by reflection,
arrive at a more constant and established judgment concerning them.
In like manner, though sympathy be much fainter than our conce
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