al abilities and
moral virtues, yet the former distinction will afford us a plausible
reason, why moralists have invented the latter. Men have observed, that
though natural abilities and moral qualities be in the main on the
same footing, there is, however, this difference betwixt them, that the
former are almost invariable by any art or industry; while the latter,
or at least, the actions, that proceed from them, may be changed by the
motives of rewards and punishments, praise and blame. Hence legislators,
and divines, and moralists, have principally applied themselves to the
regulating these voluntary actions, and have endeavoured to produce
additional motives, for being virtuous in that particular. They
knew, that to punish a man for folly, or exhort him to be prudent and
sagacious, would have but little effect; though the same punishments
and exhortations, with regard to justice and injustice, might have a
considerable influence. But as men, in common life and conversation,
do not carry those ends in view, but naturally praise or blame whatever
pleases or displeases them, they do not seem much to regard this
distinction, but consider prudence under the character of virtue as well
as benevolence, and penetration as well as justice. Nay, we find, that
all moralists, whose judgment is not perverted by a strict adherence
to a system, enter into the same way of thinking; and that the antient
moralists in particular made no scruple of placing prudence at the head
of the cardinal virtues. There is a sentiment of esteem and approbation,
which may be excited, in some degree, by any faculty of the mind, in its
perfect state and condition; and to account for this sentiment is the
business of Philosophers. It belongs to Grammarians to examine what
qualities are entitled to the denomination of virtue; nor will they
find, upon trial, that this is so easy a task, as at first sight they
may be apt to imagine.
The principal reason why natural abilities are esteemed, is because of
their tendency to be useful to the person, who is possessed of them.
It is impossible to execute any design with success, where it is not
conducted with prudence and discretion; nor will the goodness of our
intentions alone suffice to procure us a happy issue to our enterprizes.
Men are superior to beasts principally by the superiority of their
reason; and they are the degrees of the same faculty, which set such an
infinite difference betwixt one man and a
|