t allowing us to aspire to
the utmost perfection in either. The case is here the same as in that
law of nature concerning the stability of possession. It is highly
advantageous, and even absolutely necessary to society, that possession
should be stable; and this leads us to the establishment of such a rule:
But we find, that were we to follow the same advantage, in assigning
particular possessions to particular persons, we should disappoint
our end, and perpetuate the confusion, which that rule is intended to
prevent. We must, therefore, proceed by general rules, and regulate
ourselves by general interests, in modifying the law of nature
concerning the stability of possession. Nor need we fear, that our
attachment to this law will diminish upon account of the seeming
frivolousness of those interests, by which it is determined. The impulse
of the mind is derived from a very strong interest; and those other more
minute interests serve only to direct the motion, without adding
any thing to it, or diminishing from it. It is the same case with
government. Nothing is more advantageous to society than such an
invention; and this interest is sufficient to make us embrace it with
ardour and alacrity; though we are obliged afterwards to regulate and
direct our devotion to government by several considerations, which are
not of the same importance, and to chuse our magistrates without having
in view any particular advantage from the choice.

The first of those principles I shall take notice of, as a foundation of
the right of magistracy, is that which gives authority to all the most
established governments of the world without exception: I mean, long
possession in any one form of government, or succession of princes. It
is certain, that if we remount to the first origin of every nation,
we shall find, that there scarce is any race of kings, or form of a
commonwealth, that is not primarily founded on usurpation and rebellion,
and whose title is not at first worse than doubtful and uncertain. Time
alone gives solidity to their right; and operating gradually on the
minds of men, reconciles them to any authority, and makes it seem just
and reasonable. Nothing causes any sentiment to have a greater influence
upon us than custom, or turns our imagination more strongly to any
object. When we have been long accustomed to obey any set of men,
that general instinct or tendency, which we have to suppose a moral
obligation attending loyalty, t