is also better prepared for the
contest. Attractive appearance is invariably associated with
efficient functioning. Yet it takes no outstanding powers of
judgement to wake this distinction.)]
The same principle produces, in many instances, our sentiments of
morals, as well as those of beauty. No virtue is more esteemed than
justice, and no vice more detested than injustice; nor are there any
qualities, which go farther to the fixing the character, either as
amiable or odious. Now justice is a moral virtue, merely because it has
that tendency to the good of mankind; and, indeed, is nothing but
an artificial invention to that purpose. The same may be said of
allegiance, of the laws of nations, of modesty, and of good-manners. All
these are mere human contrivances for the interest of society. And since
there is a very strong sentiment of morals, which in all nations, and
all ages, has attended them, we must allow, that the reflecting on the
tendency of characters and mental qualities, is sufficient to give us
the sentiments of approbation and blame. Now as the means to an end
can only be agreeable, where the end is agreeable; and as the good
of society, where our own interest is not concerned, or that of our
friends, pleases only by sympathy: It follows, that sympathy is the
source of the esteem, which we pay to all the artificial virtues.
Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human
nature, that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and that
it produces our sentiment of morals in all the artificial virtues. From
thence we may presume, that it also gives rise to many of the other
virtues; and that qualities acquire our approbation, because of
their tendency to the good of mankind. This presumption must become a
certainty, when we find that most of those qualities, which we naturally
approve of, have actually that tendency, and render a man a proper
member of society: While the qualities, which we naturally disapprove
of, have a contrary tendency, and render any intercourse with the person
dangerous or disagreeable. For having found, that such tendencies have
force enough to produce the strongest sentiment of morals, we can never
reasonably, in these cases, look for any other cause of approbation
or blame; it being an inviolable maxim in philosophy, that where any
particular cause is sufficient for an effect, we ought to rest satisfied
with it, and ought not to multiply c
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