and good, whether
in its causes or effects, I enter so deeply into it, that it gives me a
sensible emotion. The appearance of qualities, that have a tendency to
promote it, have an agreeable effect upon my imagination, and command my
love and esteem.

This theory may serve to explain, why the same qualities, in all cases,
produce both pride and love, humility and hatred; and the same man is
always virtuous or vicious, accomplished or despicable to others, who is
so to himself. A person, in whom we discover any passion or habit, which
originally is only incommodious to himself, becomes always disagreeable
to us, merely on its account; as on the other hand, one whose character
is only dangerous and disagreeable to others, can never be satisfied
with himself, as long as he is sensible of that disadvantage. Nor is
this observable only with regard to characters and manners, but may
be remarked even in the most minute circumstances. A violent cough in
another gives us uneasiness; though in itself it does not in the least
affect us. A man will be mortified, if you tell him he has a stinking
breath; though it is evidently no annoyance to himself. Our fancy easily
changes its situation; and either surveying ourselves as we appear to
others, or considering others as they feel themselves, we enter, by that
means, into sentiments, which no way belong to us, and in which nothing
but sympathy is able to interest us. And this sympathy we sometimes
carry so far, as even to be displeased with a quality commodious to us,
merely because it displeases others, and makes us disagreeable in
their eyes; though perhaps we never can have any interest in rendering
ourselves agreeable to them.

There have been many systems of morality advanced by philosophers in
all ages; but if they are strictly examined, they may be reduced to
two, which alone merit our attention. Moral good and evil are certainly
distinguished by our sentiments, not by reason: But these sentiments
may arise either from the mere species or appearance of characters and
passions, or from reflections on their tendency to the happiness of
mankind, and of particular persons. My opinion is, that both these
causes are intermixed in our judgments of morals; after the same manner
as they are in our decisions concerning most kinds of external beauty:
Though I am also of opinion, that reflections on the tendencies of
actions have by far the greatest influence, and determine all the great