s are not more distinct in the one case than the
other. A regard to property is not more necessary to natural society,
than obedience is to civil society or government; nor is the former
society more necessary to the being of mankind, than the latter to their
well-being and happiness. In short, if the performance of promises be
advantageous, so is obedience to government: If the former interest be
general, so is the latter: If the one interest be obvious and avowed, so
is the other. And as these two rules are founded on like obligations of
interest, each of them must have a peculiar authority, independent of
the other.

But it is not only the natural obligations of interest, which are
distinct in promises and allegiance; but also the moral obligations of
honour and conscience: Nor does the merit or demerit of the one depend
in the least upon that of the other. And indeed, if we consider the
close connexion there is betwixt the natural and moral obligations, we
shall find this conclusion to be entirely unavoidable. Our interest
is always engaged on the side of obedience to magistracy; and there is
nothing but a great present advantage, that can lead us to rebellion, by
making us over-look the remote interest, which we have in the preserving
of peace and order in society. But though a present interest may thus
blind us with regard to our own actions, it takes not place with regard
to those of others; nor hinders them from appearing in their true
colours, as highly prejudicial to public interest, and to our own in
particular. This naturally gives us an uneasiness, in considering such
seditious and disloyal actions, and makes us attach to them the idea of
vice and moral deformity. It is the same principle, which causes us to
disapprove of all kinds of private injustice, and in particular of the
breach of promises. We blame all treachery and breach of faith; because
we consider, that the freedom and extent of human commerce depend
entirely on a fidelity with regard to promises. We blame all disloyalty
to magistrates; because we perceive, that the execution of justice,
in the stability of possession, its translation by consent, and
the performance of promises, is impossible, without submission to
government. As there are here two interests entirely distinct from each
other, they must give rise to two moral obligations, equally separate
and independent. Though there was no such thing as a promise in the
world, government would