pect from them
depends not on a change of their nature but of their situation, when
they acquire a more immediate interest in the preservation of order and
the execution of justice. But besides that this interest is only more
immediate in the execution of justice among their subjects; besides
this, I say, we may often expect, from the irregularity of human nature,
that they will neglect even this immediate interest, and be transported
by their passions into all the excesses of cruelty and ambition.. Our
general knowledge of human nature, our observation of the past history
of mankind, our experience of present times; all these causes must
induce us to open the door to exceptions, and must make us conclude,
that we may resist the more violent effects of supreme power, without
any crime or injustice.

Accordingly we may observe, that this is both the general practice and
principle of mankind, and that no nation, that coued find any remedy,
ever yet suffered the cruel ravages of a tyrant, or were blamed for
their resistance. Those who took up arms against Dionysius or Nero, or
Philip the second, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of
their history: and nothing but the most violent perversion of common
sense can ever lead us to condemn them. It is certain, therefore, that
in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as
that of passive obedience, but make allowances for resistance in the
more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. The general opinion
of mankind has some authority in all cases; but in this of morals it
is perfectly infallible. Nor is it less infallible, because men cannot
distinctly explain the principles, on which it is founded. Few persons
can carry on this train of reasoning:

Government is a mere human invention for the interest of society. Where
the tyranny of the governor removes this interest, it also removes the
natural obligation to obedience. The moral obligation is founded on the
natural, and therefore must cease where that ceases; especially where
the subject is such as makes us foresee very many occasions wherein the
natural obligation may cease, and causes us to form a kind of general
rule for the regulation of our conduct in such occurrences.

But though this train of reasoning be too subtile for the vulgar, it is
certain, that all men have an implicit notion of it, and are sensible,
that they owe obedience to government merely on account of the public