interest; and at the same time, that human nature is so subject to
frailties and passions, as may easily pervert this institution, and
change their governors into tyrants and public enemies. If the sense of
common interest were not our original motive to obedience, I would fain
ask, what other principle is there in human nature capable of subduing
the natural ambition of men, and forcing them to such a submission?
Imitation and custom are not sufficient. For the question still recurs,
what motive first produces those instances of submission, which we
imitate, and that train of actions, which produces the custom? There
evidently is no other principle than public interest; and if interest
first produces obedience to government, the obligation to obedience
must cease, whenever the interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a
considerable number of instances.

SECT. X OF THE OBJECTS OF ALLEGIANCE

But though, on some occasions, it may be justifiable, both in sound
politics and morality, to resist supreme power, it is certain, that in
the ordinary course of human affairs nothing can be more pernicious
and criminal; and that besides the convulsions, which always attend
revolutions, such a practice tends directly to the subversion of all
government, and the causing an universal anarchy and confusion among
mankind. As numerous and civilized societies cannot subsist without
government, so government is entirely useless without an exact
obedience. We ought always to weigh the advantages, which we reap from
authority, against the disadvantages; and by this means we shall become
more scrupulous of putting in practice the doctrine of resistance. The
common rule requires submission; and it is only in cases of grievous
tyranny and oppression, that the exception can take place.

Since then such a blind submission is commonly due to magistracy, the
next question is, to whom it is due, and whom we are to regard as our
lawful magistrates? In order to answer this question, let us recollect
what we have already established concerning the origin of government and
political society. When men have once experienced the impossibility
of preserving any steady order in society, while every one is his own
master, and violates or observes the laws of society, according to his
present interest or pleasure, they naturally run into the invention of
government, and put it out of their own power, as far as possible, to
transgress the laws of