still be necessary in all large and civilized
societies; and if promises had only their own proper obligation, without
the separate sanction of government, they would have but little efficacy
in such societies. This separates the boundaries of our public and
private duties, and shews that the latter are more dependant on the
former, than the former on the latter. Education, and the artifice of
politicians, concur to bestow a farther morality on loyalty, and to
brand all rebellion with a greater degree of guilt and infamy. Nor is
it a wonder, that politicians should be very industrious in inculcating
such notions, where their interest is so particularly concerned.

Lest those arguments should not appear entirely conclusive (as I think
they are) I shall have recourse to authority, and shall prove, from
the universal consent of mankind, that the obligation of submission to
government is not derived from any promise of the subjects. Nor need
any one wonder, that though I have all along endeavoured to establish my
system on pure reason, and have scarce ever cited the judgment even
of philosophers or historians on any article, I should now appeal
to popular authority, and oppose the sentiments of the rabble to any
philosophical reasoning. For it must be observed, that the opinions of
men, in this case, carry with them a peculiar authority, and are, in
a great measure, infallible. The distinction of moral good and evil
is founded on the pleasure or pain, which results from the view of any
sentiment, or character; and as that pleasure or pain cannot be unknown
to the person who feels it, it follows [Footnote 22], that there is just
so much vice or virtue in any character, as every one places in it, and
that it is impossible in this particular we can ever be mistaken. And
though our judgments concerning the origin of any vice or virtue, be not
so certain as those concerning their degrees; yet, since the question in
this case regards not any philosophical origin of an obligation, but a
plain matter of fact, it is not easily conceived how we can fall into
an error. A man, who acknowledges himself to be bound to another, for a
certain sum, must certainly know whether it be by his own bond, or that
of his father; whether it be of his mere good-will, or for money lent
him; and under what conditions, and for what purposes he has bound
himself. In like manner, it being certain, that there is a moral
obligation to submit to government,