se three fundamental laws of nature as antient as
society: So that taking advantage of the antiquity, and obscure origin
of these laws, they first deny them to be artificial and voluntary
inventions of men, and then seek to ingraft on them those other duties,
which are more plainly artificial. But being once undeceived in this
particular, and having found that natural, as well as civil justice,
derives its origin from human conventions, we shall quickly perceive,
how fruitless it is to resolve the one into the other, and seek, in
the laws of nature, a stronger foundation for our political duties than
interest, and human conventions; while these laws themselves are built
on the very same foundation. On which ever side we turn this subject,
we shall find, that these two kinds of duty are exactly on the same
footing, and have the same source both of their first invention and
moral obligation. They are contrived to remedy like inconveniences, and
acquire their moral sanction in the same manner, from their remedying
those inconveniences. These are two points, which we shall endeavour to
prove as distinctly as possible.
We have already shewn, that men invented the three fundamental laws
of nature, when they observed the necessity of society to their
mutual subsistance, and found, that it was impossible to maintain
any correspondence together, without some restraint on their natural
appetites. The same self-love, therefore, which renders men so
incommodious to each other, taking a new and more convenient direction,
produces the rules of justice, and is the first motive of their
observance. But when men have observed, that though the rules of justice
be sufficient to maintain any society, yet it is impossible for them,
of themselves, to observe those rules, in large and polished societies;
they establish government, as a new invention to attain their ends, and
preserve the old, or procure new advantages, by a more strict execution
of justice. So far, therefore, our civil duties are connected with
our natural, that the former are invented chiefly for the sake of the
latter; and that the principal object of government is to constrain men
to observe the laws of nature. In this respect, however, that law of
nature, concerning the performance of promises, is only comprized along
with the rest; and its exact observance is to be considered as an effect
of the institution of government, and not the obedience to government as
an effect
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