s, and have no public
interest in view, they are less disturbed in their progress by new
obstacles; and it must be owned, that, after the first absurdity, they
follow more directly the current of reason and good sense. Theologians
clearly perceived, that the external form of words, being mere sound,
require an intention to make them have any efficacy; and that this
intention being once considered as a requisite circumstance, its absence
must equally prevent the effect, whether avowed or concealed, whether
sincere or deceitful. Accordingly they have commonly determined, that
the intention of the priest makes the sacrament, and that when he
secretly withdraws his intention, he is highly criminal in himself; but
still destroys the baptism, or communion, or holy orders. The terrible
consequences of this doctrine were not able to hinder its taking place;
as the inconvenience of a similar doctrine, with regard to promises,
have prevented that doctrine from establishing itself. Men are always
more concerned about the present life than the future; and are apt to
think the smallest evil, which regards the former, more important than
the greatest, which regards the latter.
We may draw the same conclusion, concerning the origin of promises, from
the force, which is supposed to invalidate all contracts, and to free us
from their obligation. Such a principle is a proof, that promises have
no natural obligation, and are mere artificial contrivances for the
convenience and advantage of society. If we consider aright of the
matter, force is not essentially different from any other motive of hope
or fear, which may induce us to engage our word, and lay ourselves under
any obligation. A man, dangerously wounded, who promises a competent
sum to a surgeon to cure him, would certainly be bound to performance;
though the case be not so much different from that of one, who promises
a sum to a robber, as to produce so great a difference in our sentiments
of morality, if these sentiments were not built entirely on public
interest and convenience.
SECT. VI SOME FARTHER REFLECTIONS CONCERNING JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE
We have now run over the three fundamental laws of nature, that of the
stability of possession, of its transference by consent, and of the
performance of promises. It is on the strict t observance of those three
laws, that the peace and security of human society entirely depend; nor
is there any possibility of establishing
|