and of an imperfect,
it is easy to observe, that this arises from a fiction, which has no
foundation in reason, and can never enter into our notions of natural
justice and equity. A man that hires a horse, though but for a day, has
as full a right to make use of it for that time, as he whom we call its
proprietor has to make use of it any other day; and it was evident, that
however the use may be bounded in time or degree, the right itself is
not susceptible of any such gradation, but is absolute and entire, so
far as it extends. Accordingly we may observe, that this right both
arises and perishes in an instant; and that a man entirely acquires the
property of any object by occupation, or the consent of the proprietor;
and loses it by his own consent; without any of that insensible
gradation, which is remarkable in other qualities and relations, Since,
therefore, this is die case with regard to property, and rights, and
obligations, I ask, how it stands with regard to justice and
injustice? After whatever manner you answer this question, you run into
inextricable difficulties. If you reply, that justice and injustice
admit of degree, and run insensibly into each other, you expressly
contradict the foregoing position, that obligation and property are not
susceptible of such a gradation. These depend entirely upon justice and
injustice, and follow them in all their variations. Where the justice is
entire, the property is also entire: Where the justice is imperfect, the
property must also be imperfect And vice versa, if the property admit of
no such variations, they must also be incompatible with justice. If you
assent, therefore, to this last proposition, and assert, that justice
and injustice are not susceptible of degrees, you in effect assert,
that they are not naturally either vicious or virtuous; since vice
and virtue, moral good and evil, and indeed all natural qualities,
run insensibly into each other, and are, on many occasions,
undistinguishable.

And here it may be worth while to observe, that though abstract
reasoning, and the general maxims of philosophy and law establish this
position, that property, and right, and obligation admit not of
degrees, yet in our common and negligent way of thinking, we find great
difficulty to entertain that opinion, and do even secretly embrace the
contrary principle. An object must either be in the possession of
one person or another. An action must either be performed or not T