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necessity there is of choosing one side in these dilemmas, and the
impossibility there often is of finding any just medium, oblige us,
when we reflect on the matter, to acknowledge, that all property and
obligations are entire. But on the other hand, when we consider the
origin of property and obligation, and find that they depend on public
utility, and sometimes on the propensities of the imagination, which are
seldom entire on any side; we are naturally inclined to imagine, that
these moral relations admit of an insensible gradation. Hence it is,
that in references, where the consent of the parties leave the referees
entire masters of the subject, they commonly discover so much equity and
justice on both sides, as induces them to strike a medium, and divide
the difference betwixt the parties. Civil judges, who have not this
liberty, but are obliged to give a decisive sentence on some one side,
are often at a loss how to determine, and are necessitated to proceed
on the most frivolous reasons in the world. Half rights and obligations,
which seem so natural in common life, are perfect absurdities in their
tribunal; for which reason they are often obliged to take half arguments
for whole ones, in order to terminate the affair one way or other.
(3) The third argument of this kind I shall make use of may be explained
thus. If we consider the ordinary course of human actions, we shall
find, that the mind restrains not itself by any general and universal
rules; but acts on most occasions as it is determined by its present
motives and inclination. As each action is a particular individual
event, it must proceed from particular principles, and from our
immediate situation within ourselves, and with respect to the rest of
the universe. If on some occasions we extend our motives beyond those
very circumstances, which gave rise to them, and form something like
general rules for our conduct, it is easy to observe, that these rules
are not perfectly inflexible, but allow of many exceptions. Since,
therefore, this is the ordinary course of human actions, we may
conclude, that the laws of justice, being universal and perfectly
inflexible, can never be derived from nature, nor be the immediate
offspring of any natural motive or inclination. No action can be either
morally good or evil, unless there be some natural passion or motive
to impel us to it, or deter us from it; and it is evident, that die
morality must be susceptible of
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