man mind, and
change its character in such fundamental articles. All they can pretend
to, is, to give a new direction to those natural passions, and teach us
that we can better satisfy our appetites in an oblique and artificial
manner, than by their headlong and impetuous motion. Hence I learn to do
a service to another, without bearing him any real kindness; because I
forsee, that he will return my service, in expectation of another of
the same kind, and in order to maintain the same correspondence of good
offices with me or with others. And accordingly, after I have served
him, and he is in possession of the advantage arising from my action,
he is induced to perform his part, as foreseeing the consequences of his
refusal.
But though this self-interested commerce of man begins to take place,
and to predominate in society, it does not entirely abolish the more
generous and noble intercourse of friendship and good offices. I may
still do services to such persons as I love, and am more particularly
acquainted with, without any prospect of advantage; and they may make me
a return in the same manner, without any view but that of recompensing
my past services. In order, therefore, to distinguish those two
different sorts of commerce, the interested and the disinterested, there
is a certain form of words invented for the former, by which we
bind ourselves to the performance of any action. This form of words
constitutes what we call a promise, which is the sanction of the
interested commerce of mankind. When a man says he promises any thing,
he in effect expresses a resolution of performing it; and along with
that, by making use of this form of words, subjects himself to the
penalty of never being trusted again in case of failure. A resolution is
the natural act of the mind, which promises express: But were there
no more than a resolution in the case, promises would only declare our
former motives, and would not create any new motive or obligation. They
are the conventions of men, which create a new motive, when experience
has taught us, that human affairs would be conducted much more for
mutual advantage, were there certain symbols or signs instituted,
by which we might give each, other security of our conduct in any
particular incident, After these signs are instituted, whoever uses them
is immediately bound by his interest to execute his engagements, and
must never expect to be trusted any more, if he refuse to perform wha
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