s. Now a thing is
knowable in the degree in which it is; hence since this is the
essence of evil that it is the privation of good, by the fact that
God knows good things, He knows evil things also; as by light is
known darkness. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii): "God through
Himself receives the vision of darkness, not otherwise seeing
darkness except through light."

Reply Obj. 1: The saying of the Philosopher must be understood as
meaning that the intellect which is not in potentiality, does not
know privation by privation existing in it; and this agrees with what
he said previously, that a point and every indivisible thing are
known by privation of division. This is because simple and
indivisible forms are in our intellect not actually, but only
potentially; for were they actually in our intellect, they would not
be known by privation. It is thus that simple things are known by
separate substances. God therefore knows evil, not by privation
existing in Himself, but by the opposite good.

Reply Obj. 2: The knowledge of God is not the cause of evil; but is
the cause of the good whereby evil is known.

Reply Obj. 3: Although evil is not opposed to the divine essence,
which is not corruptible by evil; it is opposed to the effects of
God, which He knows by His essence; and knowing them, He knows the
opposite evils.

Reply Obj. 4: To know a thing by something else only, belongs to
imperfect knowledge, if that thing is of itself knowable; but evil is
not of itself knowable, forasmuch as the very nature of evil means
the privation of good; therefore evil can neither be defined nor
known except by good.
_______________________

ELEVENTH ARTICLE [I, Q. 14, Art. 11]

Whether God Knows Singular Things?

Objection 1: It seems that God does not know singular things. For the
divine intellect is more immaterial than the human intellect. Now the
human intellect by reason of its immateriality does not know singular
things; but as the Philosopher says (De Anima ii), "reason has to do
with universals, sense with singular things." Therefore God does not
know singular things.

Obj. 2: Further, in us those faculties alone know the singular, which
receive the species not abstracted from material conditions. But in
God things are in the highest degree abstracted from all materiality.
Therefore God does not know singular things.

Obj. 3: Further, all knowledge comes about through the medium of some
likeness. But the likeness