ows all contingent things not only as they
are in their causes, but also as each one of them is actually in
itself. And although contingent things become actual successively,
nevertheless God knows contingent things not successively, as they
are in their own being, as we do but simultaneously. The reason is
because His knowledge is measured by eternity, as is also His being;
and eternity being simultaneously whole comprises all time, as said
above (Q. 10, A. 2). Hence all things that are in time are present to
God from eternity, not only because He has the types of things
present within Him, as some say; but because His glance is carried
from eternity over all things as they are in their presentiality.
Hence it is manifest that contingent things are infallibly known by
God, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight in their
presentiality; yet they are future contingent things in relation to
their own causes.

Reply Obj. 1: Although the supreme cause is necessary, the effect may
be contingent by reason of the proximate contingent cause; just as
the germination of a plant is contingent by reason of the proximate
contingent cause, although the movement of the sun which is the first
cause, is necessary. So likewise things known by God are contingent
on account of their proximate causes, while the knowledge of God,
which is the first cause, is necessary.

Reply Obj. 2: Some say that this antecedent, "God knew this
contingent to be future," is not necessary, but contingent; because,
although it is past, still it imports relation to the future. This
however does not remove necessity from it; for whatever has had
relation to the future, must have had it, although the future
sometimes does not follow. On the other hand some say that this
antecedent is contingent, because it is a compound of necessary and
contingent; as this saying is contingent, "Socrates is a white man."
But this also is to no purpose; for when we say, "God knew this
contingent to be future," contingent is used here only as the matter
of the word, and not as the chief part of the proposition. Hence its
contingency or necessity has no reference to the necessity or
contingency of the proposition, or to its being true or false. For it
may be just as true that I said a man is an ass, as that I said
Socrates runs, or God is: and the same applies to necessary and
contingent. Hence it must be said that this antecedent is absolutely
necessary. Nor does it fol