ined by the
conformity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this conformity
is to know truth. But in no way can sense know this. For although
sight has the likeness of a visible thing, yet it does not know the
comparison which exists between the thing seen and that which itself
apprehends concerning it. But the intellect can know its own
conformity with the intelligible thing; yet it does not apprehend it
by knowing of a thing "what a thing is." When, however, it judges that
a thing corresponds to the form which it apprehends about that thing,
then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and
dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes
from the thing signified by the subject, some form signified by the
predicate: and this clearly shows that the sense is true of any thing,
as is also the intellect, when it knows "what a thing is"; but it does
not thereby know or affirm truth. This is in like manner the case with
complex or non-complex words. Truth therefore may be in the senses, or
in the intellect knowing "what a thing is," as in anything that is
true; yet not as the thing known in the knower, which is implied by
the word "truth"; for the perfection of the intellect is truth as
known. Therefore, properly speaking, truth resides in the intellect
composing and dividing; and not in the senses; nor in the intellect
knowing "what a thing is."

And thus the Objections given are solved.
_______________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 16, Art. 3]

Whether the True and Being Are Convertible Terms?

Objection 1: It seems that the true and being are not convertible
terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated
(A. 1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not
convertible.

Obj. 2: Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not
convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being;
for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not.
Therefore the true and being are not convertible.

Obj. 3: Further, things which stand to each other in order of
priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true
appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except
under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not
convertible.

_On the contrary,_ the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the
same disposition of things in being and in truth.

_I answer that,_ As good has the natur